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Some researchers have found that peo-
ple repeatedly make the same errors in
their inflation predictions, often expect-
ing inflation to be higher than it turns
out to be. And others find that people
appear to ignore readily available infor-
mation that would help improve the
accuracy of their forecasts.2 In short,
people’s inflation expectations do not
appear to be “rational.”
The most respected survey of house-
hold attitudes is conducted by the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s Survey Research
Center, which has tracked the inflation
predictions of U.S. households for more
than 50 years. The problem with the
survey’s measure of inflation expecta-
tions can be readily seen in figure 1. If
we consider a period over which infla-
tion was relatively constant (1990 to
1999), the Michigan survey shows that
average (or “mean”) household infla-
tion expectations persistently exceeded
inflation as measured by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). Over this period,
people predicted 4.1 percent inflation
on average—more than a percentage
point above the CPI’s actual reading
(3.0 percent). 
Why these survey data are commonly
wide of the mark and frequently higher
than the official inflation estimates is
unknown. Some economists suggest that
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In this Commentary, we document that
people report very different percep-
tions and predictions of inflation
depending upon their income, educa-
tion, age, race, and gender—a strange
finding that may provide an important
clue to understanding how to interpret
survey data of inflation expectations.
“Price stability means that expected
changes in the average price level…




Suppose your employer offers you a
contract that promises a 5 percent raise
next year. Would you accept? To evaluate
the agreement, you need to predict next
year’s inflation. If you expect 6 percent
inflation, you would probably decline the
offer, because it means your inflation-
adjusted, or “real” income, will drop 
1 percent. But if you expect only 2 per-
cent inflation, the 3 percent increase in
your real income might be enough to
persuade you to agree. In other words,
economic decisions are based on the 
real value of things, and therefore, if
economists hope to understand the
behavior of the marketplace, we must 
see through nominal values to the “real”
returns on which monetary decisions 
are actually made. 
But an accurate gauge of inflation expec-
tations is more than an academic interest.
It is an important object of central bank
policy. The potential for inflation intro-
duces an added risk into all monetary
decisions that a risk-averse public will
seek to protect itself against. For example,
banks will add an inflation “risk 
premium” into interest rate calculations,
workers will negotiate “cost-of-living”
provisions into their labor agreements,
and investors will allocate their resources
in favor of assets whose values are less
sensitive to inflation erosion. All of these
defensive actions involve costs that are
unnecessary in a world secure from infla-
tion. It is for this reason that the Federal
Reserve’s stated objective, as Chairman
Greenspan’s quote suggests, is about more
than eliminating inflation; it is also about
eliminating the expectation of inflation.
The straightforward way to judge public
inflation expectations is to go out and
ask people, and in fact, a few surveys 
do exactly that. But many economists
question the reliability of survey-based
measures of public inflation expecta-
tions; as a result, frustrated academics
and policymakers have turned to indirect
measures of the public’s inflation senti-
ment, like the behavior of asset prices,
economists’forecasts, and past inflation
trends. Failure to directly assess the pub-
lic’s inflation expectations has left a gap
in economists’ability to easily separate
nominal from real values and has
obscured an important variable in the
deliberations of the central bank.
Three years ago, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, in association with
the Ohio State University, began to
investigate the inflation sentiment of
Ohioans using survey data. This effort
has uncovered an intriguing result. Sur-
vey-based estimates of inflation senti-
ment are dramatically and systematically
influenced by the demographic charac-
teristics of the respondent. Income, edu-
cation, age, race, and gender are all
strongly correlated with respondents’
perceptions of inflation and their fore-
cast of future inflation. We believe this
finding provides an important clue in
understanding inflation opinion surveys. 
■ And the Survey Says…
Why aren’t surveys of the public’s infla-
tion expectations taken more seriously?
The problem is that if you simply ask 
people what course they expect inflation to
take, the average response does not track
the realized inflation data very closely.households have no incentive to answer
the question correctly, and therefore
may not answer the survey with much
care. But this isn’t a very satisfying
answer. It suggests that respondents are
not telling the truth or they have no well-
formed outlook on inflation. But if peo-
ple don’t have well-formed expectations
about inflation, on what basis do they
make monetary decisions? 
Others take an even more extreme posi-
tion, suggesting that people hold irra-
tional views about inflation. If true, this
conclusion calls into question virtually
every economic decision made by the
public and effectively demolishes the
models that economists and policy-
makers use to understand the behavior
of the marketplace. Clearly, a more thor-
ough study of household responses to
inflation expectation surveys is needed. 
■ Prediction or Perception?
Since August 1998, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland and the Ohio State
University have conducted a monthly
telephone survey of a representative
sample of Ohioans. Using language 
similar to the University of Michigan’s
survey, we ask how much the respon-
dent expects prices to rise (or fall) over
the next 12 months (see inset for an
overview of the survey). The average
expectation for inflation for the first 
28 months of our survey was 5.2 per-
cent, a high estimate compared to the
inflation recorded by the CPI—about
3.1 percent. This seemingly large “over-
estimate” is largely consistent with our
earlier findings using the University of
Michigan survey. 
We begin our investigation of this puzzle
with a rather crude reality check, by ques-
tioning respondents about their perception
of price increases that have already
occurred. That is, we ask our sample of
Ohioans how much they think prices rose
over the past 12 months. To our surprise,
respondents say inflation was about 6 per-
cent on average over the 40 months of our
survey; the average increase in the CPI
over the same period, however, was only
2.7 percent, which means they overesti-
mated past inflation even more than they
did future inflation. So the public’s appar-
ent high expectation of future inflation
may not tell us anything about people’s
predictive abilities, but rather how they
perceive actual price movements.
■ The Importance of 
Demographics
We next consider whether everyone per-
ceives inflation to be significantly above
the official data or whether only a subset
of the population does. Table 1 provides
an answer to that question by reporting
average inflation perceptions and expec-
tations for a number of demographic
groups. What stands out in the data is the
large disparity in the inflation estimates
of different groups of people. For exam-
ple, respondents in the lowest income
quintile (the bottom 20 percent of all
incomes) say inflation was twice as high
as respondents in the highest income
quintile (4.5 percentage points higher!).
Similarly, younger (18 to 25 years)
respondents say inflation was higher
than their middle-aged counterparts, sin-
gle respondents say it was higher than
those who are married, nonwhites say it
was higher than whites, and women say
it was higher than men.3
A closer look at the responses within
these specific groups is also informative.
The differences in inflation sentiment
between groups does not appear to be
merely a product of a few extreme
views, but rather a relatively widely
shared perspective within each group.
The variability of expectations (as mea-
sured by the standard deviation of the
responses) does not change much across
groups. Neither do there seem to be
more outliers in one group compared to
any others (as measured by comparing
the skewness of each group’s responses). 
All of these various demographic quali-
ties are related, of course. For example,
that inflation perceptions and predic-
tions fall with educational attainment is
certain to be related to the finding that
inflation perceptions and predictions fall
as income grows, since people with less
education also tend to be people with
lower incomes. 
To disentangle related demographic
qualities, we conducted statistical tests
that allow us to isolate the influence of
each demographic characteristic on the
inflation prediction of the respondent,
using the University of Michigan survey
data. We find that virtually all of the
demographic characteristics we exam-
ined tend to be correlated with the
respondent’s inflation prediction. In
table 1 we report the net influence of
various demographic characteristics as a
deviation from the baseline of a married,
middle-aged, white male with some col-
lege, who is in the middle income quin-
tile (the middle 20 percent of incomes).
Respondents in the low income quintile
hold inflation expectations that are
about a percentage point above those in
the reference group. Those in the high-
est income quintile expect about a half
percent lower inflation. Respondents
with less than a high school education
tend to predict about 1 percent more
inflation per year than respondents with
more than a high school degree. Young
respondents expect about half a percent-
age point more inflation than middle-
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers.about 1 percent less than nonwhites, and
women about 1 percent more than men.4
We believe this finding is the basis for
why some researchers who use Michi-
gan survey data on inflation expectations
have tended to focus on the “median”
survey response rather than the “mean”
response.5Although the two survey
estimators mirror one another closely,
the median has averaged about 1 per-
centage point less than the mean (figure
1). Since the median tracks the CPI
more closely, some say it represents a
“better” measure of the public’s infla-
tion expectations. This may be true. But
our research sheds some light on this con-
clusion. We now know that the median
response effectively reduces the influence
of certain demographic groups when we
tally up the responses. Simply, the median
response disproportionately cuts out the
inflation expectations reported by lower-
income, less-educated, nonwhite, and
female respondents.  
■ Different People, 
Different Inflation?
Could it be that the costs of the different
market baskets these various groups 
purchase are sufficiently dissimilar in
their growth that the disparate views of
inflation are all accurate reflections taken 
from different perspectives? If so, this
might explain why the survey responses
do not align closely with the CPI. This 
is because the CPI is an expenditure-
weighted price index. This means that 
the CPI’s market basket is implicitly
weighted toward the spending habits of
higher-income, better-educated, middle-
aged people and away from the spending
habits of the demographic group that 
represents the average survey respondent.
However, a recent study by an economist
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (the
agency responsible for constructing the
CPI), shows that reweighting the CPI on
the basis of population demographics,
rather than expenditure shares, has only
a marginal influence on the recorded
inflation rate.6 Specifically, while the
expenditure-weighted CPI averaged 
3.27 percent over the 1987–97 period, the
population-weighted statistic averaged
3.33 percent—a fairly small difference.
In other words, the rise in the cost of liv-
ing experienced by people in different
demographic groups appears to be much
too small to explain why they report such
different inflation sentiments.
■ What We (Don’t) Know 
What we now know is this: People in
different demographic groups report
persistently different expectations about
inflation. Moreover, these expectations
appear to be less a function of how 
well people forecast inflation and more
a matter of how they perceive it. That is,
different people perceive price move-
ments differently—much differently. 
What we still don’t know is why. If the
prices of things purchased by men,
high-income, middle-aged, or married
people don’t persistently rise less than
the things bought by women, low-
income, older, or single people, why
would such groups say they do? 
a.  FRBC/OSU Inflation Psychology Survey,August 1998–November 2001.
b.  University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers, June 1986–December 1999.
c.  The reference group, white, married, male, with some or all college, in the middle income quintile, and aged 46–55, is
denoted by “r.” All results are significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
SOURCES: FRBC/OSU Inflation Psychology Survey; University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers; and 
authors’calculations.
TABLE 1 MEAN INFLATION PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP 
Perceptionsa Expectations
Percentage
Standard Standard point deviation
deviation/ deviation/ from reference
Mean skewness Meana skewnessa groupb,c
Full sample  5.9 10.6/4.2 5.4 9.3/4.5 –
Male 4.6 9.1/4.6 4.0 6.7/3.3 r
Female 6.9 11.5/4.0 6.4 10.7/4.4 1.0
White 5.6 9.9/4.5 5.0 8.5/5.5 r
Nonwhite 7.9 14.4/3.2 7.7 13.0/2.1 1.0
Single 6.7 11.7/3.2 6.0 10.3/2.5 –0.2
Married 5.4 9.7/5.4 4.9 8.3/7.2 r
Elementary school 8.7 12.6/2.7 7.4 11.4/1.8 1.1
Some high school 7.5 12.2/3.3 6.6 10.7/3.0 0.7
More than high school 4.8 9.0/5.7 4.4 7.8/7.1 r
Low income 9.2 14.5/2.4 8.4 13.7/2.8 1.1
Low-middle income 7.4 11.4/2.8 6.3 9.8/2.3 0.4
Middle income 6.0 9.7/3.5 5.3 8.3/2.7 r
High-middle income 4.7 8.5/4.9 4.4 6.9/2.6 –0.2
High income 4.7 9.8/6.9 4.4 8.4/9.0 –0.4
18–25 years old 6.8 11.2/2.5 6.4 10.4/1.9 0.6
26–35 years old 5.5 10.6/4.2 5.2 8.9/3.1 0.3
36–45 years old 5.6 10.3/4.1 5.4 9.3/3.2 0.2
46–55 years old 5.3 9.8/8.5 5.2 8.1/3.1 r
56–65 years old 6.0 11.0/3.3 5.3 8.5/3.3 –0.3
>65 years old 7.1 11.2/2.7 5.1 10.6/9.4 –0.5
THE FRBC/OSU INFLATION PSYCHOLOGY SURVEY
The Inflation Psychology Survey is part of the larger Buckeye State Poll, which has
been conducted monthly since November 1996 by the Ohio State University Col-
lege of Social and Behavioral Sciences Survey Research Unit. The poll asks at least
500 randomly selected Ohio households a number of questions about their confi-
dence in the U.S. economy and economic conditions. In August 1998, four ques-
tions on inflation perceptions and expectations were added. These constitute the
Inflation Psychology Survey: 
■ During the last 12 months, do you think that prices in general went up, or 
went down, or stayed the same?
■ By about what percent do you think prices went up (down), on the average,
during the last 12 months?
■ During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up,
or go down, or stay the same?
■ By about what percent do you think prices will increase (decrease), on the
average, over the next 12 months?What’s at stake here is quite important
because it suggests the potential for large
variations in the “real” values different
groups envision. For example, if groups
with lower incomes really do perceive
inflation to be much higher than higher-
income groups, it suggests that their
expected real return to saving is also
much lower. Perhaps this curious finding
can help to explain why such groups tend
to save disproportionately less than their
richer counterparts. But such conclusions
are premature. Before we can make any
definitive statement about the implica-
tions of the widely different inflation
predictions we see across demographic
groups, we must have a better apprecia-
tion of the factors that give rise to them. 
■ Footnotes
1. Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, February 21, 1989 (emphasis
added by authors).
2. A good overview of these issues can
be found in Dean Croushore, “Inflation
Forecasts: How Good Are They?” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Business Review, May/June, 1996. 
3. For a more thorough discussion 
of the differences by gender, see
Michael F. Bryan and Guhan Venkatu,
“The Curiously Different Inflation Per-
spectives of Men and Women,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic
Commentary, November 2001.
4. These tests also reveal that once we
account for other demographic character-
istics, single respondents hold slightly
smaller inflation expectations than the
reference respondent (0.2 percentage
point less.) That is, single people’s some-
what high inflation expectations appear
to be largely a function of their income
and age and not that they are unmarried.
5. See, for example, Lloyd B. Thomas, 
“Survey Measures of Expected U.S.
Inflation,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 13, no. 4 (Fall 1999), 
pp. 125–44.
6.  See Mary Kokoski, “Alternative CPI
Aggregations: Two Approaches,”
Monthly Labor Review, vol. 123, no. 11
(November 2000), pp. 31–39.
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